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While many studies have documented deviations from the Law of One Price in 
international settings, evidence is scarce on the extent to which consumers take 
advantage of price differentials and engage in cross border shopping. We use data 
from 287 Swedish municipalities to estimate how responsive alcohol sales are to 
foreign prices, and relate the sensitivity to the location’s distance to the border. 
Typical results suggest that the elasticity with respect to the foreign price is around 
0.4 in the border region; moving 200 (400) kilometers inland reduces it to 0.2 (0.1). 
Given that cross country price differences for alcohol and other products are often 
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That prices of many goods differ considerably across countries is well documented.
1 
What we know much less about, however, is to what extent consumers actually take 
advantage of these price differentials and engage in cross border arbitrage. To provide 
evidence on this, we examine the responsiveness of alcohol sales in Swedish 
communities to foreign prices, and relate the price sensitivity to a location’s distance 
to the border.  
With the deeper integration of the European Union (EU) and its expansion, the 
effects of cross border trade has become an important policy issue as in many cases 
the price differences are due to taxes set by individual member states. The resulting 
price differentials may be so great that consumers in high tax countries do their 
purchases elsewhere, with important consequences for tax revenues. In fact, it is 
sometimes argued that countries “compete” by lowering taxes to attract foreign 
demand leading to an equilibrium with taxes at a lower level than if countries had 
been able to coordinate; see for instance Kanbur and Keen (1993).
2 These issues 
figure prominently in the ongoing debate on tax harmonization within the EU and can 




“The Commission concludes that more convergence of the rates of 
excise duty [on alcohol] in the different Member States is needed so as 
to reduce distortions of competition and fraud. However, given the 
widely differing views in the Member States about the appropriate 
levels of the minimum rates, and given that any change would require 
                                                 
1 See for instance Engel and Rogers (1996), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Haskel and Wolf (2001), 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), Goldberg and Verboven (2005). 
2 Theoretical work using a game theoretic framework was pioneered by Mintz and Tulkens (1986). 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) examine a tax setting game between two governments. In their model 
consumers incur a transport cost to shop in the other country such that the closer to the border they live, 
the less costly is it to go shopping abroad. In their analysis a less densely populated country will set the 
lower tax rate since it has relatively less to loose from lowering taxes. Wang (1999) shows that this 
result from Kanbur and Keen is further strengthened if the large country decides on tax first.  Nielsen 
(2001) let countries differ in size rather than in population density, and similarly finds that the smaller 
country sets the lower tax rate; see Keen (2002) for a survey.  
3 Some recent cuts in alcohol taxation by Denmark (October 2003) and Finland (March 2004) were 
prompted by concerns over cross border shopping from Germany and Estonia, respectively. This, in 
turn, caused Sweden to consider the effects of reducing its taxes to limit the price differential with 
neighbouring Denmark and Finland (SOU, 2004). Britain was recently sued by the European 
Commission (October 2004) on claims that it tried to hinder high volume cross border shoppers of 
alcohol in a way that is inconsistent with the common market.    3
unanimous agreement, the Commission is not making a proposal at this 
time. Instead the Commission wishes to launch a broad debate in the 
Council, the European Parliament,…” (Press release May 26, 2004).  
 
 
A key problem in this debate is that little is known about the magnitude of 
cross border shopping, see Keen (2002) for a discussion. Interview studies indicate 
that the effects might be substantial. Frequently cited work by Fitzgerald (1992) for 
instance reports that in 1986 about 25 percent of spirits bought in the Republic of 
Ireland were bought in Northern Ireland. Campbell and Lapham (2004) examine links 
between the number of firms along the Canada-US border and the real exchange rate. 
They find that when prices in the US fall relative to prices in Canada (a real exchange 
rate depreciation) there is a significant increase in the number of sellers and/or in the 
average employment on the US side of the border for the four industries they study 
(food stores, gasoline service stations, drinking and eating places). Their findings are 
thus consistent with substantial changes in demand as a result of relative price 
changes and therefore with substantial cross border flows. However, based on an 
interview study by Ford (1992), they argue that for the industries in question the 
effects of cross border shopping are confined to border counties. Goldberg and 
Verboven (2005) report that, despite persistent price differences, cross border 
shopping of automobiles in Europe is limited. There also exist some papers that 
examine spillover effects of different sales taxes across US states (see e.g. Fox, 1986, 
and Walsh and Jones, 1988).
4 This literature suggests that low prices across the border 
are important for sales in the border counties but it is an open question whether this 
also has an effect on the interior.  
An unusually ambitious interview study by the Centre for Social Research on 
Alcohol and Drugs provides an indication of the extent of cross border shopping of 
alcohol. Since 2001, about 18000 randomly selected Swedes per year have been asked 
about their consumption of alcohol, and also the sources. Figure 1, which is based on 
data in Table 6.1 in SoRAD (2004), shows the consumption in 2003 from the three 
main sources of alcohol consumption (the Swedish government retail monopoly, 
                                                 
4 A related literature examines the revenue impact at the state level of taxes in neighbouring states. This 
literature shows that cross border shopping acts as a constraint on the possibilities to raise state revenue 
by sales taxes, gasoline taxes or state lotteries. See Garrett and Marsh (2002) for references. Similarly, 
Beard et al (1997) try to infer the amount of cross border shopping from state level data on alcohol 
sales. Another somewhat related paper is Goolsbee (2000) who documents more Internet sales in high 
sales tax locations.      4
legally imported, illegally imported), measured in liter of pure alcohol.
5  The data is 
disaggregated by seven regions. As discussed below, the gateway to lower alcohol 
prices is in Sweden’s south western corner and we measure each region’s average 
distance to Malmö. Bearing in mind the problem with measurement errors
6 with this 
type of data, the general picture that emerges is that the fraction of imported alcohol is 
negatively related to the distance to the border. There is, however, only a weak 
tendency of a negative relationship between the distance and the sum of the three 
sources. This aggregate data suggests that the prevalence of cross border shopping is 
related to the distance to the border and that it is roughly replacing domestic sales. 
However, even with this type of data, a more quantitative analysis is needed in order 
to disentangle the relationship between demand at the local level, domestic and 
foreign prices, and distance to the border. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In this paper we use data from the Swedish government retail monopoly to 
estimate how the sensitivity of sales to foreign prices depends on the distance to the 
border. A number of features make this an unusually clean case. First, we have 
monthly data on sales of spirits, wine, and beer over a ten year period for each store 
that sells alcohol in Sweden. Second, prices are the same across the country. This 
implies that prices in border areas are not endogenously lower, which in other cases 
could blur the picture. At the same time, relative prices between countries have varied 
considerably due both to major tax changes and volatile exchange rates. Third, as seen 
in the Figure 2, geography suggests that it is easy to measure the distance to the 
relevant Danish border. The shape of the country (from north to south it is a drive of 
about 2000 kilometers or 24 straight hours) also gives us substantial variation to 
exploit.  
Our findings suggest that distance to the border plays an important role for the 
extent of cross border arbitrage. Using our estimates from spirits, in a border region 
                                                 
5 For ease of comparison, we have excluded consumption a) at restaurants and pubs b) of beer and 
ciders with low alcohol content that can be bought outside Systembolaget, and c) of homemade 
alcoholic beverages.  
6 The telephone interviews underestimate the true consumption, due primarily to peoples’ systematic 
underreporting of their own consumption (see www.sorad.su.se/alkrapp.pdf). SoRAD has attempted to 
correct for this in the numbers we use for Figure 2.    5
the demand elasticity with respect to the foreign price is about 0.4 while moving 200 





The government owned retail monopoly (Systembolaget) made available monthly 
volume data on sales of spirits, wine, and beer at all its approximately 600 outlets. For 
the regressions we aggregate the data and use variation in per capita sales across 287 
Swedish municipalities over the period January 1995 – July 2004 to estimate demand 
functions. A great advantage with data from Systembolaget is that it is required to 
keep the same prices and assortment in all stores (at smaller outlets the customer 
needs to order some products in advance), which implies that prices are not influenced 
by local demand conditions.  
To measure the development of prices, we use price indices from Eurostat for 
the different product categories
7. Foreign price indices are converted to Swedish 
kronor by the corresponding monthly average exchange rate. All prices are deflated 
by the Swedish Consumer Price Index. Figures 3a-3c show the development of 
aggregate sales, as well as Swedish and Danish price indices, for the three product 
categories. Although there is a great deal of seasonal variation, the broad trends with 
increasing sales of beer and wine, and a steady decline of spirits, are clearly visible. 
The most drastic price movements are due to tax changes in Sweden (January 1997 
for beer and December 2001 for wine) and Denmark (October 2003 for spirits). The 
floating exchange rate between Swedish kronor and Danish kronor contributes to the 
comparatively high volatility of the Danish prices when expressed in Swedish kronor.  
 
 
[FIGURES 3a-3c ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
                                                 
7 We use the Harmonized Consumer Price Indices obtained from the Eurostat database for spirits 
(cp0211), wine (cp0212) and beer (cp0213). These are monthly indices available for all individual 
member countries.    6
The prices are indices and thus do not inform us about differences in the level 
of prices between countries. However, Horverak and Osterberg (2002) gives us a 
snapshot, as of June 1999, of the prices of identical baskets in Denmark and Sweden. 
At that time a basket with beer was 27 percent cheaper and the spirits basket was 10 
percent cheaper in Denmark; the basket with wine was 1.5 percent more expensive. 
We have normalized the price indices in Figures 3a-3c to reflect the difference at this 
date.  While the compositions of these baskets certainly differ from those that form 
the basis of the price indices, this nevertheless suggest that over essentially the whole 
time period spirits are cheaper in Denmark, wines are at least as expensive as in 
Sweden, and beer much cheaper in Denmark.  
Another way of examining the price levels comes from the Purchasing Power 
Parity indices of alcoholic beverages that Eurostat calculates on a yearly basis. For 
each year the average price for the EU-15 is 100.
8 The average of this index over 
1995-2003 was 235 for Norway, 188 for Finland, 162 for Sweden, 129 for Denmark 
and 83 for Germany. Thus, on average a basket of alcohol was some 25 percent more 
expensive in Sweden than in Denmark, and almost twice as expensive as in Germany. 
The levels obviously differ over the years but the ranking is consistent.  To avoid the 
influence of Norwegian and Finnish cross border shoppers, we exclude all Swedish 
municipalities that border Norway or Finland in our regressions. However, we report 
separate regressions to illustrate the effects in the northern regions when Finland 
drastically cut the tax on spirits in March 2004.  
       When  Sweden  joined  the  European Union in January 1995 it agreed to 
gradually loosen the restrictions on the alcohol that could be brought in from other 
member countries. From December 1994 to July 2004 the legal quota had increased 
from 1 liter of spirits, 1 liter of wine, and 2 liters of beer to 10 liters of spirits, 90 liters 
of wine and 110 liters of beer. (The 1994 quotas applied to imports from outside EU 
throughout the period.) The main gateway to lower alcohol prices is in Sweden’s 
south-west corner (see Figure 2). To Denmark there are quick ferries from 
Helsingborg, and in July 2000 a toll bridge was opened linking Malmö to 
Copenhagen, Denmark (before this there were quick ferries linking the two cities). To 
                                                 
8 We use the series for alcohol, “A010201” from the database “Purchasing power parities (PPP) and 
comparative price level indices for the ESA95 aggregates”.   7
Germany, there are a number of ferry lines from Trelleborg.
9, 10 Our main measure of 
distance to the border is kilometers by car (by the fastest route) to Malmö; Malmö, 
Helsingborg, and Trelleborg are very closely situated and the correlation between 
distance measures to these locations will be very close to one.  
In Figure 4 we relate the change in per capita sales between May 1995 and 
May 2004 to the distance to the Malmö. The figures show a striking upward sloping 
relation between the distance from the border and the growth in sales.
11 The 
regression lines indicate that there is a concave relation between sales growth and 
distance (results in Table 1). In regressions (not reported) this concave relation was 
robust to the inclusion of disposable income at the municipality level (data only 
available until 2002). The relation was also robust to the exclusion of the more 
northerly ferry ports (Helsingborg, Göteborg and Varberg) and their surrounding 
municipalities – a finding consistent with our assumption that the Malmö-Trelleborg 
area was the main gateway.   
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. Econometric model 
 
That distance to the border seemed to play a role for the development of a region’s 
alcohol sales was shown above. In this section we estimate how sensitive regional 
sales are to the price across the border, P
F, and the domestic price, P
D.
12  
                                                 
9 For the different alternatives, the distance in hours (one way) and prices per car with same day return 
in 2004 were in Swedish kronor (kr) (9kr~1Euro): Malmö-Denmark (bridge) 15minutes, 500kr; 
Helsingborg-Denmark 20min, 580kr; Trelleborg-Germany 4hours, 650kr. There are also infrequent 
ferries to Denmark further north: Varberg-Denmark 4 hours, 1195kr and Göteborg-Denmark 3 hours, 
745kr.  
10 When Poland and the Baltic States joined the European Union in May 1 2004 additional low price 
locations became accessible. However, Poland is 8 hours from Ystad (south of Malmö) and Estonia is 
15 hours from Stockholm and we have not tried to measure the impact of these improved opportunities 
to buy cheap alcohol.  
11 There is one particularly large positive outlier close to the border – the municipality of Kävlinge 
(population 25000). Closer examination of the data shows that a new store was opened right next to the 
major highway along Sweden’s west coast, attracting consumers from other areas. This new store also 
explains the sharp fall in the neighbouring municipality of Svalöv (population 10000).  
12 Demand can in principle be modelled as dependent on prices in several neighbouring countries. In 
our application, however, the fact that the distances to Denmark and Germany are virtually the same 
gives rise to a severe multicollinearity problem that we are not able to address with the relatively short 
time dimension in the data. As a consequence we run separate regressions Danish and German price.    8
The starting point is that demand per capita for alcohol of type 
j={spirits,wine,beer} in region i at time t is given by  
 
,, 0 , 1 , , , , , ln[ ] ln[ ] ln[ ] j j,i,t d, βX
DF
ji , t j j jt i jt ji jit qb b P g ( D ) P u e =+ + + ++,   (1) 
 
where X is a vector of other variables, u is unobserved heterogeneity, and e is a 
standard error term. The own price elasticity is b1. The elasticity with respect to the 
foreign price is g(d, D) and thus depends on the distance to the border, D (in 1000 
kilometers); d is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The prior is that the influence 
of the foreign price is decreasing in the distance to the border such that g’(d, D)<0 




,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 j d,   ijj i j i j i g( D ) d d D d D d D =+ × +× +× . 
 
Regions differ not only in consumption levels but may also differ in the 
seasonal purchasing patterns. The first type of heterogeneity is captured by uj,i in (1), 
while the second would be captured in Xj,i,t by region specific dummy variables for 
each calendar month. We use 12-month differences, ∆12, to take out these region 
specific effects and estimate  
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12 , , ,0 ,1 12 , ,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 12 , 12 , , ln[ ] ln[ ] ( ) ln[ ] βX
DF
jit j j jt j j i j i j i jt t jit qb b P d d D d D d D P ε ∆= + ∆ + + + + ∆ + ∆ +
             
          ( 2 )  
In (2) we have omitted the subscripts j and i on Xt to emphasize that it 
includes no region or type specific variables. The only variable in Xt is the log of the 
number of Fridays in the month (four or five), to capture that traditionally most of the 
sales are on Fridays (until 2003, outlets were closed on Saturdays and Sundays).  
We estimate (2) as a system of seemingly unrelated equations (SUR) to 
account for the fact that error terms are correlated (correlation of 0.6-0.8) across 
equations but treating  12 , ln[ ]
D
jt P ∆  and  12 , ln[ ]
F
jt P ∆  as uncorrelated with the error terms. 
The reason for assuming that  12 , ln[ ]
F
jt P ∆  is predetermined is that the national price 
                                                 
13 This is analogous to a parametric version of the model of Pinkse et al (2002).    9
indices of Denmark and Germany are unlikely to be influenced by local Swedish 
demand shocks.
14 The institutional fact that prices do not vary across Swedish 
locations and that changing taxes is a very drawn out process are two reasons for why 
endogeneity of  12 , ln[ ]
D
jt P ∆  is not an issue here.
15  
 
4. Results  
 
In the regressions below, we exclude municipalities that border to Norway or Finland. 
We also report results for the subsample where March and April months are excluded, 
since sales are greatly influenced by which month Easter falls. We also use a 
subsample where, in addition, all municipalities more than 1000 kilometers away 
from Denmark and Germany are excluded.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results when the foreign price is defined as the price in Denmark and Germany 
for the three categories are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. Overall, 
coefficients are significant with the expected signs and are plausible in magnitude. 
The effects on demand of changes in foreign prices are quite similar for the two price 
indices. One might have expected the effect of German prices to be weaker, since it is 
more costly to go there both in terms of time and outlays. However a counteracting 
influence may be that German prices are substantially lower than Danish prices. For 
some consumers, who buy large quantities, the extra distance associated with 
shopping in Germany rather than in Denmark will be worthwhile. Instead of focusing 
on any particular coefficient, we use Figures 5a-5c to illustrate the effect of a 
                                                 
14 Given the population sizes of the countries (Denmark, 5.4m, and Germany, 82.8m) it is unlikely that 
national prices are influenced by demand from Swedish cross border shoppers. The fact that P
F is a 
national average does in itself not rule out the possibility prices just across the border are influenced by 
local Swedish demand shocks. However, since Copenhagen with a population of 1.7 million is the 
border town this suggests that changes in prices there are driven by changes in Danish rather than 
Swedish conditions. The argument also applies to the local prices in Germany.  
15 For instance, in response to concerns about cross border arbitrage following the Danish tax cut in 
October 2003, a government commission was initiated in January 2004. As of February 2005, their 
recommendations are still under review and various interested parties can still influence the outcome. 
Before any new taxes will come into effect, the final proposal will first have to pass parliament and be 
written into law, something that might take at least another year.    10
hypothetical 10 percent reduction in the price of Danish spirits, wine and beer, 
respectively. A 10 percent reduction in the Danish price of spirits causes a fall in per 
capita sales of roughly 4 percent at the border (Malmö). This large cross price 
elasticity is almost half the own price elasticity. As seen the effect of the tax-cut 
diminishes gradually as one moves further from the border. The fall in sales is 
estimated to drop below 1 percent only at 460 kilometer from the border and not until 
we reach 1000 kilometers can we reject that the effect is zero.    
 
[FIGURES 5a-5c ABOUT HERE] 
 
For beer the effects again disappear around 1000 kilometers, while for wine 
the effect tapers off much more rapidly, reaching zero at some 200 kilometers from 
the border. A likely explanation for this difference is that prices of beer are 
significantly lower across the border while prices of most medium to high quality 
wines are about the same. However, in Demark there exist low quality wines that are 
cheaper than any that can be found in Sweden. This could give rise to modest amounts 
of cross border shopping.  
Overall, it might be surprising that effects may stretch this far from the border. 
Note though that these products are easily transported and storable – by driving down 
to Denmark the price conscious consumer could keep her bar stocked with just one or 
two yearly trips. Calculations of the cost savings associated by going to Denmark to 
buy alcohol were particularly common in Swedish press around the time of the 
Danish tax cut of 2003. One example (from the tabloid Expressen, October 20, 2003) 
claimed that two persons sharing a car from Stockholm (around 600 kilometers from 
Malmö) and each buying the full quota at the time would save 3200 kronor (around 
350 euros).  
Our data set allows another opportunity to relate the effects of lower foreign 
prices to demand in different locations. Historically beer and wine have been cheaper 
in Sweden than in Finland, while the prices of spirits have been roughly equal in the 
two countries.
16 This changed two months before Estonia was due to enter the 
European Union in May 2004. Finland feared the effects of a very large price 
                                                 
16 In June 1999 for instance a basket of beer (wine) was 13 (19) percent more expensive in Finland than 
in Sweden, while a basket of spirits was some 2 percent cheaper in Finland (Horverak and Osterberg, 
2002).   11
differential with its neighbor and therefore reduced the spirits tax by 44 percent 
resulting in a fall of the spirits price index by 38 percent relative to the previous 
month. This in turn made spirits prices in Finland very attractive to Swedes in the 
northern parts of the country.
17 The price indices of wine and beer fell by 7 percent. 
In Table 4 we examine the effects on the northern regions. We use the 12-
month percentage change in sales in the sparsely populated northernmost 34 
municipalities (maximum distance to the Finnish border is 742 kilometers). With only 
five months of data we have essentially no variation in ∆12P
D or ∆12P
F and we 
therefore estimate a SUR specification with only a third order polynomial of distance, 
and the percentage change in the number of Fridays, as independent variables.
18  
While the effects of distance on sales of wine and beer are very marginal, 
spirits sales are highly sensitive.
19 For spirits the point estimate suggests that sales at 
the border municipalities fell by 44 percent relative to the year before. For the five 
months in question, ∆12P
F, was about 0.40 which suggest that the cross price elasticity 
at the border was about unity. Moving 200 kilometers away from the border the 
elasticity would fall to 0.3 and at 400 kilometers it is around 0.15. The estimated 
elasticities at the Finnish border are thus even higher than at the Danish border. This 
is no doubt due to the fact that there is no direct cost of crossing the Finnish border. 
For instance, from the single Systembolaget store in the border municipality of 
Haparanda to the Finnish counterpart (Alko) in Tornio there is only a 10 minute drive, 
which could definitely be worthwhile even for small purchases. As noted in footnote 
9, traveling to Demark by bridge or ferry involves direct costs of at least 500 kronor.   
  
 





                                                 
17 Before the tax cut a liter of Absolute Vodka cost the equivalent of 329 kronor in Finland and after 
219 kronor which can be compared to 310 kronor in Sweden.  
18 For spirits, ∆12P
F ranged from -0.409 to -0.395 and ∆12P
D between -0.001 and -0.014.  
19 For wine, distance to the border has no significant effect which might be explained by the fact that 
wine even after the tax cut remained more expensive in Finland. For beer there is a small but 
statistically significant effect which could potentially also be due to substitution away from 
domestically sold beer to spirits bought in Finland.    12
5. Conclusion 
 
Many studies have documented deviations from the Law of One Price in international 
settings. Our analysis of alcohol sales across Swedish regions offers an indication that 
the magnitude of cross border arbitrage that these deviations give rise to can be 
substantial. By estimating demand functions we have shown that the sensitivity of 
regional sales with respect to foreign prices depends on the distance to the border. The 
estimated elasticities are naturally highest at the communities near the border but the 
effect lingers several hundred kilometers inland.   
  From a policy perspective, cross border shopping can have a significant effect 
on a country’s tax revenues. Calls for tax harmonization within the European Union 
have often been accompanied by references to domino effects (“race to the bottom”) 
of differential alcohol taxation. For instance, Denmark and Finland reduced their 
taxes with reference to cross border shopping in neighboring countries with low prices 
(Germany and Estonia, respectively); Sweden is currently contemplating the effects of 
lowering its taxes to get prices closer in line with its closest neighbors. Our estimates 
suggest that indeed the consequences for tax revenues are non-trivial. Taking the 
recent Danish spirits tax cut in October 2003 and making a back of the envelope 
calculation of the effects on Swedish tax revenues suggest a direct loss of about 214 
million kronor (some 24 million euro per year or 2.7 euro per capita).
20 While the tax 
revenue implications in general will depend on many factors, these numbers 
nevertheless suggest that the literature on tax competition between governments 







                                                 
20 We calculate the percentage fall in sales volume that is implied by estimates in column 2 in Table 2 
for each municipality. By multiplying these numbers with municipal population and tax revenue per 
liter of spirits (201 kronor per liter of spirits and an additional 66 kronor in VAT if we use a medium 
price brand of spirits as a basis for the VAT calculations) we reach the above number. As a 
comparison, we estimate that the Finnish tax cut in March 2004, which had an effect primarily on the 
sparsely populated northern regions, lowered Swedish tax revenues by 21.5 million kronor per year.    13
Table 1. Change in regional sales volume related to  
distance to Danish border. Dependent variable is  
108-month difference (May 1995 - May2004) in  
























[0.040] [0.048] [0.040] 
Observations  233 233 233 
R-squared  0.32 0.30 0.24 
Test
b  0.00 0.00 0.00 
[Robust standard errors] 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
a)  Sample excludes municipalities that border to Norway and Finland. 
b)  Test is the probability that Dist=Dist
2=0. 
   14
Table 2. Change in regional sales volume. Dependent variable is 12-month difference in log of sales volume, ∆12ln[qj,i,t].  
Foreign price, P




















































































 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
 
Observations  25603 19305 25603 19305 25603 19305 
“R2”  0.11 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.08 
Test
c  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[Robust standard errors] 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
a) Sample excludes municipalities that border to Norway and Finland.  
b) Sample excludes municipalities that border to Norway and Finland and those where Dist>1.00 (1000 kilometers), and March and April months.  





F]=0.   15
Table 3. Change in regional sales volume. Dependent variable is 12-month difference in log of sales volume, ∆12ln[qj,i,t].  
Foreign price, P



















































































 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
 
Observations  25603 19305 25603 19305 25603 19305 
“R2”  0.06 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.10 
Test
c  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[Robust standard errors] 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
a) Sample excludes municipalities that border to Norway and Finland.  
b) Sample excludes municipalities that border to Norway and Finland and those where Dist>1.00 (1000 kilometers), and March and April months.  
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Table 4. Change in regional sales volume. Dependent variable is 12-month  
difference in log of sales volume, ∆12ln[qi,t] for the period March 2004-July 2004. 









*** -0.12  0.14 
 [0.46]  [0.34]  [0.41] 
Dist
2 -6.01
*** 0.76 0.11 
 [1.32]  [0.97]  [1.17] 
Dist
3 4.20
*** -0.85  -0.32 
 [1.11]  [0.81]  [0.98] 
∆12ln[Fridays]  0.05 -0.03  -0.01 
 [0.04]  [0.02]  [0.03] 
Constant -0.44
*** -0.01  -0.01 










a 0.00  0.17  0.08 
[Robust standard errors] 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
a) Test is the probability that Dist=Dist
2= Dist
3=0. 
   17
Figure 1. Estimated sources of alcohol consumption and distance to the Danish border from the approximate population 
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Illegal imports Legal imports Systembolaget  18
             




Note: PI  is the average alcoholic price index for each country over the period 1995-2003. 






























   19
Figure 3a-3c. Per capita sales and real prices of spirits, wine and beer. Sweden  
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         Figure 4. Percentage change in sales per capita, Swedish municipalities May 1995-May 2004                          
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Figure 5a-5c. Estimated effect on sales volumes for spirits, wine and beer in Swedish 





   Distance in km to Danish border 
 
  
        -10.0 
  -7.5 
 -5.0 
  -2.5 
0 
















    
Point estimate and 95% confidence 
interval (upper and lower bound). 
 
Distance in km to Danish border 
  
  
       -5.0 
 -2.5 
     0 
 2.5 
5.0 

















    
Point estimate and 95% confidence 
interval (upper and lower bound). 




         -1.25  
0 


















     
Point estimate and 95% confidence 




Anderson, James and Eric Van Wincoop (2004), “Trade costs”, Journal of Economic 
Literature 42, 691-751. 
 
Beard, T. Randolph, Paula A. Gant and Richard P. Saba (1997), “Border-crossing 
sales, tax avoidance, and state tax policies: An application to alcohol”, Southern 
Economic Journal 64, 293-306. 
 
Campbell, Jeffrey R. and Beverly Lapham (2004), “Real exchange rate fluctuations 
and the dynamics of retail trade industries on the U.S.-Canada border”, American 
Economic Review 94, 1194- 1206. 
 
Commission (2004), “Report from the Commission to the Council, The European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on the rates of excise 
duty applied on alcohol and alcoholic beverages”, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/rpt/2004/com2004_0223en01.pdf  
  
Engel, Charles and John Rogers (1996), “How wide is the border”, American 
Economic Review 86, 1112-1126. 
 
FitzGerald, John D. (1992), “The distortionary effects of taxes on trade in border areas: 
the Republic of Ireland-UK border.” In Georg Winckler (ed.), Tax Harmonization 
andFinancial Liberalization in Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Fox, William F. (1986), “Tax structure and the location of economic activity along 
state borders”, National Tax Journal 39, 387-401. 
 
Ford, Theresa (1992), “International outshopping along the Canada-United States 
border: The case of western New York”, Working paper, Canada-United States Trade 
Center at the State University of New York at Buffalo. 
 
Garrett, Thomas A. and Thomas L. Marsh (2002), “The revenue impacts of cross 
border lottery shopping in the presence of spatial autocorrelation”, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics 32, 501-519. 
  
Goldberg, Penelopi K. and Michael M. Knetter (1997), “Goods prices and exchange 
rates: What have we learned?”, Journal of Economic Literature, 1243-1272. 
  
Goldberg, Penelopi K. and Frank Verboven (2005), “Market integration and 
convergence to the law of one price: evidence from the European car market,” Journal 
of International Economics 65, 49-73. 
 
Goolsbee, Austan (2000), “In a world without borders: The impact of taxes on 
Internet Commerce”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 561-576.  
 
Haskel, Johnathan and Holger Wolf (2001), “The law of one price – a case study”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103, 545-559. 
   23
Horverak, Oyvind and Esa Österberg (2002), “Utviklingen i avgifter og priser på 
alkoholdrikker i Norden på 1990-tallet”, Nordisk Alkohol & Narkotikatidskrift 19, 
91-105. [In Norwegian: The development of tariffs and prices of alholic beverages in 
Nordic countries in the 1990s]. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen (1993), “Jeux sans frontières: Tax competition and 
tax coordination when countries differ in size”, American Economic Review 83, 977-
892. 
 
Keen, Michael (2002), “Some international issues in commodity taxation”, IMF 
Working paper 02/124. 
 
Mintz, Jack and Henry Tulkens (1986), “Commodity tax competition between 
member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency,” Journal of Public 
Economics 29, 133-172. 
 
Nielsen, Soren B. (2001), “A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross-
border Shopping”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103, 599-624. 
 
Pinkse, Joris, Margaret E. Slade, and Craig Brett (2002), “Spatial price competition: A 
semiparametric approach”, Econometrica 70, 1111-1153. 
   
SoRAD (2004), “Tabellredovisning av svenska folkets alkoholvanor 2003”, [In 
Swedish: Tables of the alcohol habits of the Swedish people 2003], Stockholm. 
 
SOU (2004), “Var går gränsen?”, delbetänkande av alkoholinförselutredningen, SOU 
2004:86, Finansdepartementet, Stockholm [In Swedish: Where is the border? Report 
from the governmental commission on imports of alcohol, Ministry of Finance, 
Stockholm]. 
  
Wang, You-Qiang (1999), “Commodity taxes under fiscal competition: Stackelberg 
equilibrium and optimality”, American Economic Review 89, 974-981. 
 
Walsh, Michael J. and Johnathan D. Jones (1988), “More evidence on the “border 
tax” effect: The case of West Virginia, 1979-84”, National Tax Journal 41, 261-265. 
 